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PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN THE DIGITAL
AGE: LIABILITY OF COMMERCIAL SELLERS
OF CAD FILES FOR INJURIES COMMITTED
WITH A 3D-PRINTED GUN
MIKA SHARPE ∗
The invention of new technologies, and specifically 3D printing, is quickly
changing how we shop, eat, and live. For example, current technology already
allows consumers to print a pair of shoes from the comfort of their living rooms
instead of going to the mall, and parents can 3D-print custom-shaped chicken
nuggets as an afternoon snack for their children. But, aside from the positive
changes, 3D printing poses serious safety concerns because it allows for printing of
plastic, untraceable, deadly weapons.
Whom will we hold liable when someone gets injured with a 3D-printed gun?
How will the courts apply existing law to address this novel challenge? This
Comment argues that courts should use traditional products liability laws to
hold commercial sellers of CAD files liable for injuries caused by defects arising
out of the design of their products. Specifically, this Comment finds that CAD
files are products for purposes of products liability. It further finds that 3Dprinted guns are inherently and unreasonably dangerous because they are
undetectable by standard metal detectors; their users do not need to register or go
through a background check before purchasing them; and because the public,
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including children and mentally ill persons, have unlimited access to them.
Additionally, the designs of currently available CAD files do not incorporate a
safety feature into the design of the firearm, making it more dangerous.
Commercial sellers can thus be held strictly liable for injuries caused by a gun
printed with their CAD file. In adapting traditional products liability law to
3D-printing technology, courts can encourage accountability for 3D-products
designers who might otherwise escape liability for their defective designs and
protect consumers from poorly designed CAD files.
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INTRODUCTION
Americans have a unique and intimate relationship with guns,
which, not unlike any other relationship, is often complicated. The
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution states that the
“right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed,” 1
and the Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to mean that
Americans have an individual, but not unlimited, right to possess and
carry weapons.2 Unfortunately, this right often comes at a high cost as the
number of reported gun-related deaths in the United States surpasses
those of other high-income countries.3 Balancing gun regulation and
safeguarding the constitutional rights of American citizens has been a
daunting task, one that is getting increasingly more complicated with
recent technological developments.4
While 3D printing has been around since the late 1980s,5 the
technological advances that led to the production of a fully functioning
3D-printed weapon are fairly recent developments.6 The invention of 3D
printing has undoubtedly impacted a range of industries,7 but it has also
1. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
2. McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (holding that the Second
Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense,
and the right was incorporated and made applicable to the states by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626, 635–36
(2008) (holding that Americans have the right to possess handguns in their own home
and striking down a D.C. statute that prohibited individuals from owning handguns as
unconstitutional. The Court also stated, in dicta, that Americans have the right to selfdefense but that this right is not unlimited). See generally David B. Kopel, The Supreme
Court’s Thirty-Five Other Gun Cases: What the Supreme Court Has Said About the Second
Amendment, 12 J. ON FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 65, 65 (2000) (arguing that despite the fact
that the Court has not said so explicitly, its past decisions indicate that the justices
regard the Second Amendment right to bear arms as an individual right).
3. Kara Fox, How U.S. Gun Culture Compares with the World in Five Charts, CNN
(Mar. 9, 2018, 11:07 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/03/americas/us-gunstatistics/index.html [https://perma.cc/L6V4-M95R].
4. See generally Jessica Berkowitz, Comment, Computer-Aided Destruction: Regulating
3D-Printed Firearms Without Infringing on Individual Liberties, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 51,
81–84 (2018) (discussing current gun laws in the United States and arguing that the
best way to regulate and monitor the 3D-printing process is to impose safeguards on
the purchase of ammunition).
5. History of 3D Printing, 3D PRINTING INDUS., https://3dprintingindustry.com/3dprinting-basics-free-beginners-guide [https://perma.cc/68LN-VN4Y].
6. Id.
7. Hospitals across the United States and the world are incorporating 3D printing
into their operations by printing prosthetic limbs and orthotic braces, creating
customized medical implants, and conducting clinical trials focused on improving
surgical outcomes. See Nancy S. Giges, Top 5 Ways 3D Printing Is Changing the Medical
Field, AM. SOC’Y MECH. ENG’RS (May 2017), https://www.asme.org/engineering-

2300

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:101

created a host of safety concerns with potentially serious ramifications.
The dangers that 3D printing could create became publicized in 2013
when Cody Wilson, a then twenty-five-year-old law student at the University
of Texas, created and successfully fired the world’s first-ever 3D-printed
gun, named “the Liberator.”8 Simultaneously, Wilson’s organization,
Defense Distributed, released digital blueprints of the “Liberator” on its
website, allowing all internet users to download and print their own guns.9
On August 8, 2018, twenty-three-year old Austin James David West was
arrested at his home after sharing his plan to carry out a mass shooting
at Broadview University with an untraceable 3D-printed gun. 10 The
authorities intervened before West harmed anyone, but this chilling
incident provides a glimpse of what may be the future of crime. 11
What will happen when someone does get injured or killed with a
3D-printed gun? Who will be liable? This Comment proposes that
Defense Distributed, and other commercial sellers of CAD files, should
be held strictly liable for injuries caused by defects arising out of their
designs. Part I will provide background information on the 3D printing
process.12 It will also discuss Defense Distributed’s operations and provide
topics/articles/manufacturing-design/top-5-ways-3d-printing-changing-medical-field
[https://perma.cc/G9ZY-AUZR] (assessing how “hospitals across the U.S. and around
the [world] are setting up 3D printing labs . . . so that [doctors] can incorporate the
process into [their daily] work”); see also Adam Thierer & Adam Marcus, Symposium,
Guns, Limbs, and Toys: What Future for 3D Printing?, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 805, 810–
12 (2016) (discussing the potential benefits of 3D printing across different industries).
8. Who Is Cody Wilson, the Man Behind the 3D Printed Gun?, CNN TECH. (Aug. 1,
2018, 1:01 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/08/01/technology/3d-printed-guncody-wilson-defense-distributed/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZYS5-YZNY]; Jacob
Silverman, A Gun, a Printer, an Ideology, NEW YORKER (May 7, 2013), https://
www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/a-gun-a-printer-an-ideology
[https://perma.cc/M35X-8GBZ]; Doug Gross, Video Shows Test Firing of 3-D-Printed
Handgun, CNN (May 6, 2013, 7:44 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2013/05/06
/tech/innovation/3d-gun-video/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZYS5-YZNY].
9. Susannah Cullinane & Doug Criss, All Your Questions About 3D Guns Answered,
CNN (Aug. 2, 2018, 8:24 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2018/07/31/us/3d-printedplastic-guns/index.html [https://perma.cc/7MT5-Q7V7].
10. Pat Reavy, Utahn Threatened Mass School Shooting Using 3D-Printed Gun, Police Say,
DESERET NEWS (August 28, 2018, 12:05 PM), https://www.deseretnews.com/
article/900029678/utahn-threatened-mass-school-shooting-using-3d-printed-gunpolice-say.html [https://perma.cc/6ZBA-8Y2M].
11. See Justin Wise, Utah Man Threatened to Commit Mass School Shooting with 3DPrinted Gun: Police Say, THE HILL (Aug. 28, 2018, 4:17 PM), https://thehill.com/
blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/404045-utah-man-threatened-to-commit-massschool-shooting-with-3d [https://perma.cc/624J-S65K ] (reporting that officials
seized a 3D-printed gun after reviewing West’s communications with a fellow student
and charged him for “threat of violence”).
12. Infra part I.A.
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an overview of the organization’s legal challenges that began in 2013. 13
Further, Part I will examine current gun laws in the United States and
the regulations applicable to gun sellers and manufacturers. 14 Then,
it will analyze prior judicial decisions involving lawsuits between gun
manufacturers and sellers. 15 Part II will provide an overview of existing
tort laws, mainly focusing on products liability. 16 Part III will use prior
judicial decisions to apply current products liability laws to potential
claims against commercial sellers like Defense Distributed. 17 Part III
goes on to argue that Defense Distributed, as a commercial seller, can
be held liable for injuries committed with 3D-printed weapons because
the design of the CAD file constitutes a product defect due to its
inherently dangerous character. Finally, the conclusion suggests that
the federal government should play a central role in enacting
legislation that directly addresses the legality and regulation of 3Dprinted weapons. 18
I. BACKGROUND
A. The 3D Printing Process
The process of 3D printing, otherwise known as additive manufacturing or
rapid prototyping, involves building an object by layering many thin sheets of
a material, which eventually create the predesigned product.19 There are
many different types of 3D printing processes, but the most common is the
Fused Deposition Modelling (“FDM”).20 The process is guided by an

13. Infra Section I.B.
14. Infra Part II.
15. Infra Section II.A.
16. Infra Part III.
17. Infra Part IV.
18. Infra Part V. Please note that, aside from where necessary for support and
context, this Comment will not analyze Constitutional challenges associated with
regulation and liability of 3D printing, nor will it focus on intellectual property
concerns. While those issues pose complex and important questions, addressing them
thoroughly is beyond the scope of this Comment.
19. Introduction–What Is 3D Printing?, 3D PRINTING INDUS., https://
3dprintingindustry.com/3d-printing-basics-free-beginners-guide
[https://perma.cc/HN3J-7ARS]. Materials used with an FDM 3D printer are called
thermoplastics. While plastics are the most commonly used type of material, many
others can be used such as metals, ceramics, paper, bio materials, and others. Materials
are often developed for specific applications. Thierer & Marcus, supra note 7, at 807–08.
20. Scott J. Grunewald, What You Need to Know About 3D Printed Guns and Why You
Don’t Need to Fear Them, 3D PRINT (June 23, 2016), https://3dprint.com/139537/3dprinted-guns [https://perma.cc/B396-3P3Z]. For a description of other types of
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electronic file called a computer-aided design (“CAD”) file that
contains the data that the 3D printer needs to produce the final
object. 21 FDM slices the CAD into thousands of thin layers, which the
3D printer uses to replicate each of the individual pieces on a printing
bed. 22 Contrary to popular belief, a standard 3D printer does not have
the capability to create an object that is composed of multiple parts,
such as a gun. 23 Instead, each part must be printed individually and then
assembled upon completion.24
The cost of 3D printing has gone down significantly in the last few
years, making it more readily available to the general public. 25 While
this technology has been around since the early 1980s, recent
technological developments have greatly expanded its application. 26 3D
printing has already had a transformative impact in many different
fields, including medicine, food, dental, aerospace, automotive, and
others. 27 The process simplifies and streamlines manufacturing
processes while enabling greater flexibility and easy customization of
products at a significantly reduced cost. 28 However, 3D printing has also
made it possible to print untraceable, un-registerable, plastic weapons
without any of the procedural safeguards normally applicable to gun
owners in the United States.29
processes, see 3D Printing Processes, 3D PRINTING INDUS., https://3dprintingindustry.
com/3d-printing-basics-free-beginners-guide [https://perma.cc/ZZQ4-UJMZ].
21. Introduction–What Is 3D Printing?, supra note 19.
22. Id.
23. Grunewald, supra note 20.
24. Id.
25. In the early 1990s, 3D printers cost as much as $15,000 or more. How Much
Does a 3D Printer Cost?, 3D INSIDER, https://3dinsider.com/cost-of-3d-printer
[https://perma.cc/ZJD6-423W]. Today, they range from as little as $200 up to several
thousands. Id.; Jordan L. Couch, Additively Manufacturing a Better Life: How 3D Printing
Can Change the World Without Changing the Law, 51 GONZ. L. REV. 517, 521 (2016).
26. Couch, supra note 25, at 520.
27. Thierer & Marcus, supra note 7, at 811–12 (discussing the benefits of 3D
printing across different industries); see also James M. Beck & Matthew D. Jacobson, 3D
Printing: What Could Happen to Products Liability When Users (and Everyone Else in Between)
Become Manufacturers, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 143, 151–52 (2017) (discussing how
doctors can customize medical devices so that they perfectly match patients’ needs and
improve surgical outcomes).
28. Global Effects, 3D PRINTING INDUS., https://3dprintingindustry.com/3d-printingbasics-free-beginners-guide#06-global-effects [https://perma.cc/LWM4-FY2D]. Companies
like Shapeways allow users to upload their own designs while Shapeways will print, market,
and deliver the products to the users. SHAPEWAYS, https://www.shapeways.com/create
[https://perma.cc/XAV7-CZHK].
29. Rory K. Little, Symposium, The Legal Dimension of 3D Printing: Guns Don’t Kill
People, 3D Printing Does? Why the Technology Is a Distraction from Effective Gun Controls, 65
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The 3D printing process has become more user-friendly in the last few
years. Currently, users can choose between designing their own model or
downloading an existing design in a few quick steps.30 Companies like
MakerBot provide free software that users can download and use to
customize their own 3D prints; alternatively, users can choose from over
1.7 million 3D models already available on Thingiverse, MakerBot’s
online design platform. 31 Among MakerBot’s 1.7 million designs, users
can find models to print a variety of items such as a toothbrush holder, a
coaster, a children’s toy, an iPhone case, and many others, but the
company has a strict policy against uploading any design that “contributes
to the creation of weapons.”32
B. Defense Distributed and 3D Printing Litigation
Cody Wilson founded Defense Distributed in 2012 as an organization
“dedicated to the advancement of American gunsmithing and the
expansion of the Second Amendment.”33 In line with this vision, Wilson
set out to design the world’s first printable firearm and make the CAD
files available for download to the public. 34 In 2013, Wilson revealed the
HASTINGS L.J. 1505, 1510 (2014); Caitlyn R. McCutcheon, Note, Deeper Than a Paper
Cut: Is It Possible To Regulate Three-Dimensionally Printed Weapons or Will Federal Gun Laws
Be Obsolete Before the Ink Has Dried?, 14 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 219, 221 (2014).
30. About MakerBot 3D Printing, MAKERBOT, https://www.makerbot.com/about-us
[https://perma.cc/GQ7C-8N2Y]; Applications, 3D PRINTING INDUS., https://
3dprintingindustry.com/3d-printing-basics-free-beginners-guide#08-applications
[https://perma.cc/H36D-T9U4#05-materials].
31. MakerBot Apps, MAKERBOT, https://www.makerbot.com/3d-printers/apps
[https://perma.cc/MX62-GZUJ]; THINGIVERSE, https://www.thingiverse.com//
explore/newest/3d-printing [https://perma.cc/MK8E-YA73].
32. MakerBot Terms of Use, MAKERBOT, https://www.makerbot.com/legal/terms
[https://perma.cc/VYG3-262W].
33. U.S. Judge Temporarily Blocks Release of Blueprints for 3D-Printed Guns, NEWSTALK
(Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.newstalk.com/news/us-judge-temporarily-blocks-releaseof-blueprints-for-3dprinted-guns-500682
[https://perma.cc/FE2D-GL7L].
In
December 2012, after MakerBot Industries removed all firearms-related 3D-printable files
from the crowdsourcing website Indiegogo for violating its terms of service, Defense
Distributed set up a companion website, DEFCAD.com, where it could host the files
on its own. DEFCAD became Defense Distributed’s “marketplace.” The website is now
password protected and Defense Distributed is actively pursuing litigation to allow public access
to the files. Defcad, DEFCAD, https://defcad.com/ [https://perma.cc/MU6L-H54Y].
34. Andy Greenberg, ‘Wiki Weapon Project’ Aims to Create a Gun Anyone Can 3D-Print
at Home, FORBES (Aug. 23, 2012, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
andygreenberg/2012/08/23/wiki-weapon-project-aims-to-create-a-gun-anyone-can3d-print-at-home [https://perma.cc/78B4-9DMZ] (quoting a statement by Wilson:
“Every citizen has the right to bear arms. This is the way to really lower the barrier to
access to arms. That’s what this represents. . . . If a gun’s any good, it’s lethal. It’s not
really a gun if it can’t threaten to kill someone”); see also Fidel Martinez, Indiegogo Shuts
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“Liberator,” the first fully functional gun assembled entirely from parts
printed with a 3D printer, with the exception of the metal firing pin. 35
The release of the Liberator prompted concern among policy and legal
circles.36 Just a few days following its release, the State Department Office
of Defense Trade Control Compliance sent a letter to Wilson asking him to
take down the files, citing concerns over possible arms export violations.37
Specifically, the State Department said that by releasing the blueprints
online and allowing them to be downloaded outside of the United States,
Defense Distributed may have released technical data controlled by the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”). 38 Wilson complied

Down Campaign to Develop World’s First Printable Gun, DAILY DOT (last updated Feb. 3, 2019,
2:22
AM),
https://www.dailydot.com/news/indiegogo-3d-printed-gun-campaign
[https://perma.cc/MKR8-QMXA] (detailing Defense Distributed’s efforts to raise
capital to afford developing its prototype).
35. Gross, supra note 8; Silverman, supra note 8.
36. Bob Fredericks, Dems Introduce Law to Block Publication of 3-D Printed Gun
Blueprints, N.Y. POST (Aug. 3, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/08/03/demsintroduce-law-to-block-publication-of-3-d-printed-gun-blueprints [https://perma.cc/
66DR-VQ76] (“The idea of untraceable, undetectable guns available to anyone, even
violent criminals and domestic abusers, with the click of a mouse is utterly
terrifying. . . . This isn’t about freedom of information; this is about our national
security and our public safety.”); see also Deanna Paul, Meagan Flynn & Katie Zezima,
Federal Judge Blocks Posting of Blueprints for 3-D-Printed Guns Hours Before They Were to Be
Published, WASH. POST (July 31, 2018) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
morning-mix/wp/2018/07/31/in-last-minute-lawsuit-states-say-3-d-printable-gunspose-national-security-threat/?utm_term=.96b6ebdf1641 [https://perma.cc/YXZ8KKYG] (quoting New York Attorney General Barbara Underwood’s reaction to a
nationwide temporary restraining order as “a major victory for common sense and public
safety”). Some states have proposed bills that would require owners to register a 3D gun
similarly as would be required for registering a regular weapon, but none have become law
as of this writing. Simon Van Zulylen-Wood, Philly Becomes First City to Ban 3-D Gun Printing,
PHILA. MAG. (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.phillymag.com/news/2013/11/21/phillybecomes-first-city-ban-3-d-gun-printing; Cyrus Farivar; New NYC Bill Would Require 3D
Printed Guns to Be Registered with Police, ARS TECHNICA (June 13, 2013),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/06/new-nyc-bill-would-require-3dprinted-guns-to-be-registered-with-police [https://perma.cc/3WH9-Z2PE]; see also
Jana Winter, Homeland Security Bulletin Warns 3D-Printed Guns May Be ‘Impossible’ to Stop,
FOX NEWS (Dec. 1, 2015) http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/05/23/govt-memo-warns3d-printed-guns-may-be-impossible-to-stop.html [https://9CL6-XQ5T] (discussing how
the Department of Homeland Security circulated a bulletin among law enforcement officials
to explain that legislation can only slow, not halt, production of 3D-printed weapons).
37. For the original letter, see Glenn E. Smith, Letter from Department of State to
Defense Distributed, WIKISOURCE (May 8, 2013), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
File:Letter-from-Department-of-State-to-Defense-Distributed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UC4T-TJ56].
38. Id. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120–30 (2019). Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act
(AECA) authorizes the President to control the export and import of defense articles and
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and removed the files from the company servers but could not
minimize public access to online content. 39
In 2015, Wilson and the Second Amendment Foundation40 sued the
federal government for violating Wilson’s First and Second Amendment
rights.41 The complaint alleged that the State Department’s interpretation
of the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”) unconstitutionally restrained
free speech and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the government
from requiring Defense Distributed to undergo any approval
requirements prior to releasing the files online.42 The government
maintained that allowing for unrestricted distribution of technical data
that allows for production of weapons and their components using a 3D

services. These designated items and articles of equivalent performance capabilities are
recorded on the United States Munitions List. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2012); DIRECTORATE OF
DEF. TRADE CONTROLS (DDTC), The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR),
https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_itar_landing
[https://perma.cc/TW4E-6RKL]. Following the release of the blueprints, “the federal
government had taken the position that . . . AECA authorizes restrictions on the
internet publication of CAD data files that would allow [for 3D-printing of guns] and
their components.” Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 318 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1251
(W.D. Wash. 2018). DDTC explained that releasing the files online “constituted a
disclosure or transfer of technical data to foreign persons and was considered an
‘export’ subject to the AECA and ITAR.” Id. at 1252.
39. See Andy Greenberg, 3D-Printed Gun’s Blueprints Downloaded 100,000 Times in
Two Days (With Some Help from Kim Dotcom), FORBES (May 8, 2013, 5:12 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/05/08/3d-printed-gunsblueprints-downloaded-100000-times-in-two-days-with-some-help-from-kim-dotcom
[https://perma.cc/S7LL-ZE58] (identifying Wilson’s blueprint as one of “the most
popular files in the site’s 3-D printing category”). In the past, the group had posted
CAD files for particular components of a gun, such as the magazine for an AK-47 and
the body of an AR-15. Id.
40. The Second Amendment Foundation is a non-profit committed to protecting
Americans’ “right to keep and bear arms, through its publications, public education
programs and legal action.” What Is the Second Amendment Foundation? SECOND AMENDMENT
FOUND., https://www.saf.org/frequently-asked-questions [https:// perma.cc/E69J-PFLC].
41. Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 121 F. Supp. 3d 680, 688, 696 (W.D.
Tex. 2015) (finding that the plaintiffs had not “shown a likelihood of success” on the
merits of any of their constitutional claims), aff’d, 838 F.3d 451 (5th Cir. 2016). See
generally Deanna Paul, Meet the Man Who Might Have Brought on the Age of ‘Downloadable
Guns’, WASH. POST (July 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2018/07/18/meet-the-man-who-wants-to-bring-on-the-age-ofdownloadable-guns-and-may-have-already-succeeded [https://perma.cc/QR4W-SJ8B]
(chronicling Wilson’s creation of a printable gun).
42. See Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 838 F.3d 451, 453 (5th Cir. 2016)
(holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the public
interest in national security outweighs Defense Distributed’s right to free speech and
affirming the denial of the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction).
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printer was contrary to the government’s efforts to combat terrorism and
protect national security.43
After three years of litigation, the Trump administration settled the
case in June 2018. 44 The parties entered into an agreement whereby
the government agreed to revise the United States Munitions List
(“USML”) to allow for unlimited distribution of CAD files for the
automated production of 3D-printed weapons and to issue a public letter
stating that the files are approved for public distribution and release.45
Defense Distributed was scheduled to “reopen” its website for business on
August 1, 2018.46 However, in response to the settlement, eight attorneys
general sued to stop Defense Distributed from making the blueprints
available on the internet, arguing that the State Department violated the
states’ Tenth Amendment constitutional right to make and enforce their
own gun laws.47 Further, the states argued that they would suffer
irreparable injury if the files in question were released to the public, citing
concerns over national security.48 Judge Robert S. Lasnik of the federal
43. Id. The government opposed the motion and argued that the (1) distribution
of the files could cause serious harm to national security, hurt U.S. foreign policy, and
“warrants subjecting [the files] to ITAR’s export licensing of technical data” (2) and
further argued that the “CAD files constitute[d] the functional equivalent of defense
articles: capable . . . of ‘automatically’ generating a lethal firearm that can be easily
modified to be virtually undetectable in metal detectors and other security
equipment,” (3) that the “technology could be used in an assassination, for the
manufacture of spare parts by embargoed nations, terrorist groups . . . or to
compromise aviation security . . . [,]” and (4) both the government and the public
have a strong interest in protecting national security and foreign policy interests.
Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1202, 1204 (W.D. Wash. 2018).
44. David Sherfinski, Gun Company Wins Legal Fight to Post 3D Printable Gun Plans
Online, WASH. TIMES (July 22, 2018), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2018/jul/22/defense-distributed-wins-settlement-can-post-firea [https://perma.cc/
VE46-KHNS].
45. Washington, 315 F. Supp. at 1203. Additionally, the government agreed to pay
a significant portion of the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, and to return $10,000 that the
Defense Distributed paid in registration fees. Id.; see also DOJ, SAF Reach Settlement in Defense
Distributed Lawsuit, SECOND AMENDMENT FOUND., https://www.saf.org/doj-saf-reachsettlement-in-defense-distributed-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/KG77-CX7J] (noting that
non-automatic firearms up to .50-caliber are not inherently military).
46. Andy Greenberg, The Last-Ditch Legal Fight to Stop 3-D Printed Guns, WIRED (July
31, 2018, 10:50 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/legal-fight-stop-3d-printed-gunsdefense-distributed [https://perma.cc/2TQU-W6ED].
47. See id.
48. Washington, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 1206. In response to the defendant’s argument
that the States would not be harmed because the United States is still committed to
enforcing the UFA, the majority stated in dicta that
it is of small comfort to know that once an undetectable firearm has been used
to kill a citizen of Delaware . . . the federal government will seek to prosecute
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district court in Seattle agreed and granted a preliminary injunction,
temporarily blocking the release of the files pending the outcome of the
attorneys’ general lawsuit.49 Because the injunction only prevented
Defense Distributed from posting the files online for free, the company
began selling them instead, bypassing the order. 50
C. Gun Laws in the United States
Federal and state laws and regulations govern firearms production, sale,
ownership, and distribution.51 On a federal level, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) oversees and regulates firearms,
including the enforcement of the Gun Control Act of 1968 (“GCA”) and
the National Firearms Act of 1934 (“NFA”).52 The ATF also issues licenses

a weapons charge in federal court, while the State pursues a murder conviction
in state court. The very purpose . . . is to arm every citizen outside of the
government’s traditional control mechanisms . . . . It is untraceable and
undetectable nature of these small firearms that poses a unique danger.
Id. at 1263.
49. Tiffany Hsu & Alan Feuer, A Rush to Block Downloadable Plans for 3-D Printed
Guns, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/30
/business/downloadable-blueprints-printable-guns.html [https://perma.cc/9RTBVX6M]. Subsequently, ten more attorneys general joined the lawsuit, arguing that 3Dprinted guns are impossible to trace and constitute a threat to national security. The
original order issued on July 31, 2018 was extended until the lawsuit is resolved. See
Tiffany Hsu, 3-D Printed Gun Plans Must Stay Off Internet for Now, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/27/business/3-d-printed-guncody-wilson.html [https://perma.cc/Y4GB-TCQT ] (discussing the lawsuit).
50. Homepage, DEF. DISTRIBUTED, https://defcad.com [https://perma.cc/5GBFRYXR]. Formerly, on its homepage, Defense Distributed gave the user an option to
“discover,” “buy,” or “contribute.” A registered user could purchase a file or submit
his own design. However, as of June 2019, the website is password protected and
requires a subscription to access. Id.; see also Cody Wilson Speaks Out on Selling Blueprints
for 3D-Printed Guns After Court Order, CBS NEWS (Aug. 29, 2018, 08:09 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cody-wilson-founder-of-defense-distributed-speaksout-on-court-order-banning-3d-printed-gun-blueprints-from-being-posted-online
[https://perma.cc/C7KM-DYNK] (discussing the developments in the case and
quoting Wilson: “I could always . . . sell these files. And I’ll continue to do so”).
51. Data & Statistics, THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES,
https://www.atf.gov/resource-center/data-statistics [https:// perma.cc/3Y6F-BESA]
[hereinafter ATF].
52. Id.; Thierer & Marcus, supra note 7, at 831.

2308

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:101

and sets rules and requirements for obtaining a Federal Firearms License.53
3D-printed guns are not currently subject to regulation.54
No federal law specifically regulates 3D-printed guns or the process
of 3D printing a firearm, but two existing pieces of legislation may
cover this new way of manufacturing firearms: the Undetectable
Firearms Act of 1988 (“UFA”), 55 and the GCA. 56 The UFA states that it
is unlawful for anyone to “manufacture, import, sell, ship, deliver,
possess, transfer, or receive any firearm” that cannot be detected by
walk-through metal detectors 57 and requires that all firearms contain a
minimum of 3.7 ounces of metal so that they can be detected by
standard metal detectors. 58
In the United States, anyone may lawfully make their own firearm as
long as it is for personal use. However, a person wishing to manufacture
a firearm for sale or distribution must obtain a license. 59 Additionally,
the GCA requires that firearms have a serial number that can be used to
trace the weapon and that the purchaser undergoes a background
check.60 The Act also imposes restrictions on sellers of firearms,
prohibiting them from selling a weapon to certain classes of individuals,

53. Listing of Federal Firearms Licensees, ATF, https://www.atf.gov/firearms/listingfederal-firearms-licensees [https://perma.cc/D5VC-XQ66].
54. Vicky A. Bufano, 3D-Printed Guns: Regulations and Legal Implications, IN PUBLIC
SAFETY (Sept. 17, 2018), https://inpublicsafety.com/2018/09/3d-printed-gunsregulations-and-legal-implications [https://perma.cc/AL6E-XQHR].
55. 18 U.S.C. § 922(p) (2012).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2012). Under the GCA, a person “engaged in the business”
of manufacturing is defined as one “[w]ho devotes time, attention, and labor to
manufacturing firearms as a regular course of trade or business with the principal
objective of livelihood and profit through the sale or distribution of the firearms
manufactured . . . .” See id. § 921(a)(21)(A).
57. § 922(p)(1)(A); Is a Firearm Illegal if it Is Made of Plastic?, ATF,
https://www.atf.gov/firearms/qa/firearm-illegal-if-it-made-plastic [https://perma.cc
/JVX9-AGEF].
58. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(p)(1)(A), 922(p)(2)(C) (2012).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 923 (a), (d) (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 5822 (2012); 2626 U.S.C. § 5841
(2012); Does an Individual Need a License to Make a Firearm for Personal Use?, ATF,
https://www.atf.gov/firearms/qa/does-individual-need-license-make-firearmpersonal-use? [https://perma.cc/5H3V-DSUC]. As of 2013, Cody Wilson possesses a Type
7 federal firearms license. Cyrus Farivar, 3D-Printed Gun Maker Now Has Federal Firearms
License to Manufacture, Deal Guns, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 17, 2013, 9:00 AM),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/03/3d-printed-gunmaker-now-has-federalfirearms-license-to-manufacture-deal-guns [https://perma.cc/D3Q8-CF76]; see also Federal
Firearms Listings, ATF, https://www.atf.gov/firearms/listing-federal-firearms-licensees
[https://perma.cc/JQQ7-6H9Q] (defining a Type 7 license as “Manufacturer of Firearms
Other Than Destructive Devices” of the 11 types listed).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 922.
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such as convicted felons and mentally ill persons.61 These safeguards,
however flawed, allow the federal government to regulate firearms, but
none are currently applicable to 3D-printed guns. 62
D. Judicial Decisions Involving Liability of Gun Manufactures and Sellers
Gun manufacturers 63 in the United States are generally protected
from liability when a person commits a crime with their product.64 The
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act of 2005 (“PLCAA”) protects
gun manufacturers from any civil action “resulting from the criminal or
unlawful misuse” of a firearm or ammunition. 65 However, manufacturers
can be held liable for damages in six exceptions, including the following:
(1) when a defective product caused the injury; (2) for breach of contract;
(3) for criminal misconduct; and (4) when manufacturers had reason
to know that a gun was intended for use in a crime, in which case, they
may be liable for negligent entrustment 66 or negligence per se. 67 In
general, courts do not find gun manufacturers liable for injuries
61. Id. § 922 (d).
62. See What Say Does ATF Have in Technology Used to Produce Firearms?, ATF,
https://www.atf.gov/firearms/qa/what-say-does-atf-have-technology-used-producefirearms [https://perma.cc/48MZ-GT3E] (stating that ATF does not limit technology or
processes that may be used to produce firearms). See generally Bryan Schatz, I Built This
AK-47. It’s Legal and Totally Untraceable, MOTHER JONES (May 23, 2013, 10:00 AM),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/ak-47-semi-automatic-rifle-buildingparty [https://perma.cc/H3TZ-NW4U] (describing how to build an untraceable AK-47
with a 3D printer).
63. The term “manufacturer” means “[a]ny person engaged in the business of
manufacturing firearms or ammunition for purposes of sale or distribution . . . .” 18
U.S.C. § 921(a)(10) (2012).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 7901 et seq. (2012); see, e.g., Camden Cty. Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders v. Beretta, 273 F.3d 536, 541–42 (3d Cir. 2001) (dismissing the plaintiff’s
public nuisance claim against a gun manufacturer and concluding that the defendant
did not exercise control of the nuisance, which is a required element of a nuisance
claim); Young v. Bryco Arms, 821 N.E.2d 1078, 1092 (Ill. 2004) (declining to hold
defendant gun manufacturers liable for allegedly intentionally creating and
maintaining an illegal gun market by oversupplying certain areas with handguns). See
generally A Comprehensive Approach to Preventing Gun Violence, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO
PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, https://brady-static.s3.amazonaws.com/globals/BradyPolicy
Approach.pdf [https://perma.cc/UV5A-GZ7R] (providing an outline of potential
gun law legislation).
65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7902(a), 7903(4)–(5)(A) (2012).
66. See id. § 7903(5)(A). The PLCAA defines “negligent entrustment” as the
“[s]upplying of a qualified product by a seller for use by another person when the
seller knows, or reasonably should know, the person to whom the product is supplied
is likely to, and does, use the product in a manner involving unreasonable risk of
physical injury to the person or others.” Id. § 7903(5)(B).
67. Id. § 7903(5)(A)(ii).
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caused by criminal misuse of their products unless the product was
defective in some way when it left the hands of the manufacturer. 68
In rare cases, courts may be able to hold gun manufactures strictly
liable for defects in their products that make the products
unreasonably dangerous to foreseeable users. 69 In LeMaster v. Glock,
Inc., 70 the appellate court reversed summary judgment in favor of the
defendant gun manufacturer and held that questions of fact existed as to
whether the lack of an external safety device was a product defect that
caused the decedent’s death. 71 The court expressly rejected the trial
court’s conclusion that since the gun performed as intended, and as such,
was dangerous by its very nature, the gun was not defective.72 Further, the
court held that the question of proximate cause should have been left up
to the jury to decide because “[t]he danger of an individual being shot by
someone inadvertently putting pressure on a gun’s trigger would not be
a remote possibility.”73 Similarly, in Smith v. Bryco Arms,74 the appellate
court held that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in
favor of the defendant gun manufacturer and concluded that the lack of
a safety device, a mechanism that prevents accidental discharge of a
firearm, may constitute a product defect. 75 In Smith, the plaintiff, a
teenage boy, accidentally shot a friend when the plaintiff thought the
gun was unloaded and subsequently sued the gun manufacturer under

68. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 155, 157 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding
that the bullet manufacturer could not be held liable under strict liability theories
because bullets were not defective, nor were they unreasonably dangerous for their
intended purpose); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1252, 1266–68 (5th Cir.
1985) (holding that marketing handguns to the public is not an ultrahazardous
activity); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 773–74 (D.N.M. 1987) (concluding
that gun manufacturer cannot be held strictly liable unless the gun malfunctions);
Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1147–48, 1158 (Md. 2002) (holding
that the gun manufacturer was not liable when child shot himself with his father’s gun
because the handgun did not malfunction and the manufacturer adhered to proper
safety standards).
69. LeMaster v. Glock, Inc., 610 So. 2d 1336, 1336, 1338–39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992); K-Mart Enters. of Fla., Inc. v. Keller, 439 So. 2d 283, 283–88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Smith v. Bryco Arms, 33 P.3d 638, 650 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
70. 610 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
71. Id. at 1338 (stating that “[w]hen there is evidence that the absence of a safety
feature is a defect in a product, summary judgment for the defendant is
inappropriate”).
72. Id. at 1337–38.
73. Id. at 1338.
74. 33 P.3d 638 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
75. Id. at 650. The court noted that “[w]hether a product is unreasonably
dangerous, and therefore defective, is ordinarily a question for the jury.” Id. at 644.
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negligence and strict liability theories. 76 The complaint alleged that
the manufacturer was strictly liable under the design defect theory of
products liability because the gun did not have a usable safety device
that would have prevented his friend’s injuries and the gun contained
inadequate warnings.77 The court allowed both claims to go forward,
noting that gun manufacturers, like all other suppliers, are responsible
for “risks arising from foreseeable uses of the product, including
reasonably foreseeable unintended uses and misuses.”78
Under the GCA, firearm dealers can be held liable for selling firearms to
convicted felons, persons with mental illness, foreign nationals unlawfully
present in the United States, and several other restricted classes of
persons.79 In K-Mart Enterprises of Florida, Inc. v. Keller,80 the court held that
the retail seller was liable for selling a firearm to a purchaser who was both
a convicted felon and a habitual drug user.81 Further, the court concluded
that the purchaser’s entrustment of the firearm to his brother, who
struggled with substance abuse and ultimately shot a police officer, was not
an intervening cause that cut off the seller’s liability.82
Federal law largely protects gun manufacturers from liability stemming
from misuse of their products, but this protection is not unlimited.
Manufacturers can still be liable if a gun contained a warning,
manufacturing, or a design defect when it left the hands of the
company. 83 Most notably, in cases where the gun manufacturer failed
to incorporate a safety feature that would have made the gun safer,
courts are more inclined to impose liability based on the design defect
theory of products liability. 84
76. Id. at 641–42.
77. Id. at 642.
78. Id. at 645 (stating further that “[m]isuse of a product is not of necessity fatal
to a products liability cause of action. . . . [D]uty imposed on manufacturers and
suppliers of products to use ordinary care includes a duty to consider risks of injury
created by foreseeable misuse of the product”); see also Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co.,
216 Cal. Rptr. 68, 74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that “a manufacturer is required to
‘foresee some degree of misuse and abuse of his product . . . and to take reasonable
precautions to minimize the harm that may result from misuse and abuse’” (quoting
Self v. Gen. Motors Corp., 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974))).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (2012).
80. 439 So. 2d 283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
81. Id. at 285–86 (holding that the jury could have found that the shooting was
exactly the type of risk the Gun Control Act was designed to prevent).
82. Id. at 285, 287.
83. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
84. LeMaster v. Glock, Inc., 610 So. 2d 1336, 1339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(reversing and remanding the case after stating that if the gun at issue had included a
safety in its design, the safety would have been engaged, thus potentially avoiding an
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II. TRADITIONAL TORT LAW
Rapid technological advancements, such as development of 3Dprinting technologies, are likely to necessitate a change in existing
legal frameworks. One of the areas where 3D printing is likely to have the
biggest impact is tort liability because the technology is changing the
established dynamics between sellers, purchasers, and distributors. 85 For
starters, with respect to 3D-printed products, the courts will have to
decide who the “manufacturers” and “sellers” are, what the “product”
is, and whether the manufacturer or seller can be liable for an accident
involving the product. 86
A. Products Liability
“Products liability” is the umbrella term for the liability of a
manufacturer, seller, or supplier of defective products to the person
injured by the product.87 Liability may stem from a manufacturer or
supplier’s negligence or strict liability in tort. 88 Under the doctrine of
strict liability, liability stems not from carelessness or negligence but from
the very decision to conduct the activity in the first place. 89 The doctrine

accidental discharge); Smith v. Bryco Arms, 33 P.3d 638, 650 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001)
(reversing and remanding the case for a jury to decide if defendant was negligent in
failing to adopt a product design, which would have included additional safety features
that could have prevented the foreseeable, unintended shooting accident).
85. Beck, supra note 27, at 147–48 (arguing that tort law will need to change “in
order to continue to maintain its relevance,” in light of the development of 3D
printing); Shen Wang, Comment, When Classical Doctrines of Products Liability Encounter
3D Printing: New Challenges in the New Landscape, 16 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 104, 106–07
(2016) (discussing the impact of 3D printing on various legal fields and the potential
ambiguity of the identities of market actors that could follow from the increased use
of 3D printing technology).
86. Beck, supra note 27, at 147–48; Eric Lindenfeld, 3D Printing of Medical Devices:
CAD Designers as the Most Realistic Target for Strict, Product Liability Lawsuits, 85 UMKC L.
REV. 79, 91 (2016) (discussing the difficulties in applying traditional tort law to claims
related to 3D printing of medical devices).
87. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS, CASES AND
MATERIALS, 767 (13th ed. 2015). See generally Life Sciences Health Industry Group, 3D
Printing of Medical Devices: When a Novel Technology Meets Traditional Legal Principles, REED
SMITH 1, 15–18 (2015), http://www.reedsmith.com/files /Publication/130448b9-75654295-a697-5c5d7c6eb516/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/9ba9b53c-2009-488dba91-5cc5a19a38f7/3d-printing-white-paper_ 79444049 .pdf [https://perma.cc/2FH7546E] [hereinafter “Life Sciences”] (highlighting 3-D printing and its legal challenges).
88. SCHWARTZ, supra note 87, at 767.
89. The doctrine traces back to Rylands v. Fletcher, 1 L.R. -Ex. 265, 265 (1866):
We think that the true rule of law is that the person who for his own purposes
brings on his lands and collects and keeps there any thing likely to do mischief
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has its basis in policy: society mandates that when an actor chooses to
engage in hazardous activities, not only must he act with due care, but
he also has a duty to prevent injury and should bear the burden of any
resulting injuries. 90 The doctrine is often referred to as “absolute
liability” because the actor may be liable regardless of fault. 91 Courts
have generally categorized strict liability claims as either design,
warning, or manufacturing defects. 92 The doctrine of strict liability
applies only to commercial sellers who introduce a defective “product”
into the stream of commerce. 93
1. What is a “product?”
The Restatement (Third) of Torts defines a “product” as “tangible
personal property,” but whether something is tangible is not
determinative of whether it would qualify as a product for purposes of
products liability. 94 Courts have held that a number of non-tangible
items, such as electricity and aeronautical charts, are products. 95 In
if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so, is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.
Not all, but the majority of jurisdictions follow the rule from Rylands. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 87, at 746.
90. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (en banc)
(holding that by placing the product on the market, a manufacturer becomes strictly
liable for a defect in the product that causes injury to the consumer); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 519, cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
91. SCHWARTZ, supra note 87, at 733. Because an actor may be liable without fault,
many in the legal community have expressed views that strict liability goes against the
fundamental notions of fairness and the generally accepted standard that a guilty
person must either have a “guilty mind” or is somehow at fault, usually through
negligence. For one view of why the courts should abandon strict liability, see Alan
Schwartz, The Case Against Strict Liability, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 819, 821 (1992) (arguing
that basic assumptions underlying strict liability law are incorrect).
92. SCHWARTZ, supra note 87, at 787–88; Lindenfeld, supra note 86, at 88.
93. SCHWARTZ, supra note 87, at 788. See generally Nora Freeman Engstrom, 3-D
Printing and Product Liability: Identifying the Obstacles, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 35, 38
(2013) (presenting the obstacles and legal challenges posed by 3-D printing and strict
liability).
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. 19(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1998);
Lindenfeld, supra note 86, at 98–99; Life Sciences, supra note 87, at 16.
95. See Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1295 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding
that an aeronautical chart was a defective product for products liability
purposes); Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 676–77 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating
that navigational charts are products under the Restatement (Second) of Torts and
requiring the defendant to bear the costs of proximately caused accidents); Bryant v.
Tri-County Elec. Membership Corp., 844 F. Supp. 347, 352 (W.D. Ky. 1994)
(concluding that ordinary electricity is a product); Hous. Lighting & Power Co. v.
Reynolds, 765 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. 1988) (holding that electricity is a product
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Brocklesby v. United States, 96 the court found that aeronautical charts that
graphically depict instrument approach information for airplanes are
“products” for purposes of products liability law. 97 Similarly, in Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 98 the court held that the
defendant, Jeppesen, was strictly liable for publishing a defective
instrument approach chart and that the defect was the proximate
cause of the plane crash that killed decedents. 99
Numerous courts have found that electricity becomes a “consumable
product” for purposes of strict liability once it is “sold” into the stream
of commerce. 100 In Ransome v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 101 the court
held the defendant electric company liable because the electricity was
defective when it left the hands of the defendant because the voltage
was too high, making it unreasonably dangerous for customer use in a
residential home. 102 Specifically, the electricity had a voltage between
1000 and 4000 volts when it was “sold,” whereas 120 to 240 volts was
the voltage normally distributed to residential consumers. 103 Similarly,
in Bryant v. Tri-County Electric Membership Corp., 104 the court concluded
because it can be manufactured, transported, and sold in the stream of commerce);
Ransome v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 275 N.W.2d 641, 648–49 (Wis. 1979) (stating that the
company supplying the electricity can be held liable if the electricity was unreasonably
dangerous when it left the seller’s hands); Lindenfeld, supra note 86, at 91.
96. 767 F.2d 1288, 1296 (9th Cir. 1985) (concluding that “Jeppesen’s chart was a
‘product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user’ within the
meaning of section 402A(1)”).
97. Id. at 1292, 1296. Instrument approach charts are printed charts of instrument
approach procedures that pilots use to safely navigate the plane. These procedures
are published by the Federal Aviation Administration, military services, and other
organizations. See Equipment and Performance Requirement Notes on Instrument Approach
Procedures, AIRCRAFT OWNERS & PILOTS ASS’N, https://www.aopa.org/advocacy/
airports-and-airspace/navigation-and-charting/instrument-approach-procedures
[https://perma.cc/UQ8Q-K24A].
98. 642 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1981).
99. Id. at 341–43.
100. Bryant v. Tri-County Elec. Membership Corp., 844 F. Supp. 347, 352 (W.D. Ky.
1994); Pierce v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 283, 291 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985);
Carbone v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 482 A.2d 722, 723 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984);
Petroski v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 354 N.E.2d 736, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Hous.
Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 765 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. 1988); Ransome v. Wis.
Elec. Power Co., 275 N.W.2d 641, 648 (Wis. 1979). Electricity is considered “sold”
when it passes through the customer’s meter. See Bryant, 844 F. Supp. at 350. But see
Otte v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 523 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Ohio 1988) (holding that
strict liability never applies to producers of electricity).
101. 275 N.W.2d at 648.
102. Id. at 648–49.
103. Id. at 649.
104. 844 F. Supp. at 352.
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that “holding electricity to be a ‘product’ sensibly accounts for the fact
that electricity is created, harnessed, measured, transported, bought
and sold, like products generally.” 105
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit, in Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 106
rejected the tangible/intangible distinction and instead based its
analysis on whether the object is a “highly technical tool.” 107 In Winter,
two mushroom enthusiasts sued a book publisher when they relied on
information in a publication to pick and eat mushrooms that made them
critically ill. 108 The plaintiffs argued that the book was similar to
aeronautical charts because both “contain representations of natural
features and both are intended to be used while engaging in a hazardous
The court rejected this argument by distinguishing
activity.”109
aeronautical charts as “highly technical tools” that can be used as a guide
or a compass, whereas the book was more like an instruction manual on
how to use a technical tool, and not the technical tool in itself. 110
Accordingly, the court held that the publisher was not liable and had
no duty to investigate the accuracy of the book’s content because
thoughts and ideas are not “products.” 111
Courts have generally declined to find computer software a
“product” for the purposes of strict liability. 112 In Sanders v. Acclaim
Entertainment Inc., 113 the court dismissed the claims of negligence and
strict liability against defendant video game manufacturers, holding
that video game software is not a “product” and defendants had no
duty to two children who killed their classmates and teacher in a school
shooting after playing video games for an extended period of time. 114
Courts across the country have generally denied liability for similar

105. Id. at 352.
106. 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
107. Id. at 1036.
108. Id. at 1034.
109. Id. at 1035–36.
110. See id. In dictum, the court suggested that computer software is another example
of a highly technical tool that may be a product for purposes of product liability. Id.
111. Id. at 1036.
112. See Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc. 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 174 (D. Conn. 2013)
(holding that an interactive video game is not “product”); In re Sony Gaming Networks
& Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d 942, 959 (S.D. Cal. 2012); Sanders
v. Acclaim Entm’t, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1281–82 (D. Colo. 2002) (holding that
computer games are software and not products); James v. Meow Media, Inc., 90 F.
Supp. 2d 798, 811 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that video games are
software for purposes of strict liability).
113. 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Colo. 2002).
114. Id. at 1264.
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claims, 115 but one recent case suggests software can be a product for
purposes of products liability. 116 In Corley v. Stryker Corp, the plaintiff,
Ouita Corley, underwent a knee replacement surgery that involved use
of a “disposable, single-use cutting guide” that was intended to assist
the surgeon during the course of the knee replacement procedure. 117
The cutting guide was created from MRI or CT scans using 3D-imaging
software to develop a surgical plan prior to surgery.118 Following the
procedure, she experienced a range of issues, including pain, discomfort,
limited mobility, and more, and filed suit alleging that these problems
were due to her surgeon’s use of the defective cutting guide. 119 The
court allowed the plaintiff’s products defect claim to go forward,
finding that she had “sufficiently alleged that the cutting guide used
during Ms. Corley’s surgery was unreasonably dangerous in design due
to the alleged software defects.” 120
2. Design defects
To prevail on a design defect claim, a plaintiff must prove the
product was defective, the defect existed when the product left the
hands of the defendant, and the defect caused a physical injury to a
reasonably foreseeable user. 121 Most courts adopt either the Restatement
(Second) of Torts or Restatement (Third) of Torts, which both require the
defendant be a commercial seller or distributor before he can be held
liable for any injuries arising from his product. 122 On the other hand,
115. See Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding
that book publisher had no duty to investigate the accuracy of contents in the book,
thus plaintiffs who became severely ill after eating mushrooms after relying on
information in the book could not recover against the publisher under negligence theory);
Meow Media, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 804, 806 (holding reasonable people could not conclude
that the shooter’s exposure to video games made the shooter’s actions foreseeable to the
video game makers); Zamora v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199, 201 (S.D. Fla.
1979) (holding that three television networks could not foresee that a teenager would kill
his neighbor after watching violent programming over a ten-year period).
116. No. 6:13-CV-02571, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 3375596, at *1 (W.D. La. May 27, 2014).
117. Id. at *1.
118. Id. at *2.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *4.
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. §§ 1–2 (AM. LAW INST. 1998);
SCHWARTZ, supra note 87, at 800.
122. SCHWARTZ, supra note 93, at 787–88. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines
strict liability as “[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused . . . if the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product . . . .” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965). The
Restatement (Third) of Torts, however, defines strict liability as “[o]ne engaged in the
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courts decline to impose strict liability in cases where the defendant is
an occasional seller, 123 or if the defendant primarily provides
services. 124 For example, in San Diego Hospital Ass’n v. Superior Court of
San Diego, 125 the court declined to hold a hospital liable because “[t]he
purpose of imposing strict liability is to ensure the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are placed on the manufacturer and
others who place the product on the market . . . .” 126 In San Diego
Hospital, the hospital’s primary objective was to provide medical care
to patients, not to sell equipment. 127
Courts use one of two tests when determining whether strict liability
applies—the “consumer expectations” test and the “risk-utility” balancing
test.128 The Restatement (Second) primarily uses the “consumerexpectations” test, while the Restatement (Third) exclusively focuses on a
“risk-utility” analysis.129 A product is “defective” under the Restatement
(Second) if “it leaves the seller’s hands, in a condition not contemplated
by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to
him.” 130 In a landmark strict liability case, Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 131 the court employed the “consumer-expectations” test
and held the manufacturer liable for an injury caused by a power
tool. 132 The court noted that “[i]mplicit in the machine’s presence on
business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective
product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1998); see also
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900–01 (Cal. 1963); Halliday v.
Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1150 (Md. 2002); Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
363 A.2d 955, 963 (Md. 1976). See generally Beck, supra note 27, at 153–54 (discussing
the differences between the strict liability).
123. See, e.g., Garcia v. Becker Bros. Steel Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 73, 82 (Cal. Ct. App.
2011) (holding that an occasional seller is not strictly liable for sale of a defective
product under California law).
124. San Diego Hosp. Ass’n v. Super. Ct., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 489, 493 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994) (holding that the primary objective of the hospital is to provide services for
patients and any sale of medical products is secondary to its primary objective); Gonser
v. Decker, 814 P.2d 1056, 1058–59 (Okla. Civ. App. 1991) (declining to hold defendant
strictly liable because he is neither a commercial seller nor distributor and only allows
use of equipment as part of providing a service).
125. 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 489 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
126. Id. at 492–93.
127. Id. at 493.
128. Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1150 (Md. 2002); Prosser, supra
note 87, at 784, 788.
129. Prosser, supra note 87, at 784, 788.
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. (g) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
131. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
132. Id.
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the market, however, was a representation that it would safely do the
jobs for which it was built.” 133 On the other hand, under the
Restatement (Third)’s “risk-utility” test, a product is defective and
unreasonably dangerous if the danger posed by the product outweighs
its utility. 134 In such cases, the court must balance whether a safer
alternative design exists, and if so, whether the alternative design would
make the product safer without negatively impacting its utility. 135 For
example, in O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 136 the appellate court held that a
pool lined with slippery vinyl may constitute a product defect because
it poses an unreasonable risk of injury to the user. 137 The court
employed the risk-utility analysis, finding that a reasonable alternative
design existed and would have minimized the risks of injury at minimal
inconvenience to the defendant. 138 Further, in LeMaster and Smith,
both appellate courts reversed lower courts’ holdings and concluded
that an absence of an external safety mechanism on a gun may pose a
design defect that makes it unreasonably dangerous. 139 Conversely, in
McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 140 the victims of a mass shooting filed a
complaint against a bullet manufacturer, alleging that the bullets were
unreasonably dangerous because they were designed to enhance the
injuries of their victims. 141 The court dismissed the claims stating that
some products, such as knives and bullets, must, by their very nature,
be dangerous to be functional. 142 Because a reasonable alternative
design does not exist for a bullet or a knife, the court concluded that
133. Id. at 901; see also Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 206, 207
(N.Y. 1983) (holding defendant manufacturer liable for a defective design when the
plaintiff was injured using defendant’s circular power saw).
134. Risk-utility analysis factors that the courts weigh are the (1) usefulness and
desirability of the product; (2) the safety of the product, that is the likelihood that it
will cause injury; (3) the availability of a substitute product; (4) the manufacturer’s
ability to eliminate the unsafe character; (5) the user’s ability to avoid danger; (6) the
user’s anticipated awareness of the dangers; (7) the feasibility of spreading the loss;
and (8) the state-of-the-art of the product. See Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792
A.2d 1145, 1150 (Md. 2002); O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 304–05 (N.J.
1983) (discussing the relevant factors in a risk-utility analysis). See generally Prosser,
supra note 87, at 804 (providing a definition of product defectiveness).
135. Prosser, supra note 87, at 804.
136. 463 A.2d 298, 304–05 (N.J. 1983).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Smith v. Bryco Arms, 33 P.3d 641, 641 (Cal. 2001); LeMaster v. Glock, Inc., 610
So. 2d 1336, 1339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
140. 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997).
141. Id. at 151.
142. Id. at 155 (stating that “as a matter of law, a product’s defect is related to its
condition, not its intrinsic function”).
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the manufacturer of bullets could not have reduced the risk without
affecting the primary function of the product. 143
A manufacturer is not liable when the defect in its product is not the
legal cause of plaintiff’s injury. 144 In other words, the imposition of
liability requires a showing that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by
an act of the defendant or an instrumentality under the defendant’s
control. 145 In O’Neil v. Crane Co., 146 the court defined the limits of a
manufacturer’s duty to prevent foreseeable harm related to his
product and held that a manufacturer cannot be strictly liable for harm
caused by another manufacturer’s product unless the defendant’s own
conduct contributed substantially to the harm, or the defendant
participated in harmful combined use of the products. 147
In general, a defendant can be held liable for injuries caused by their
products if they are a commercial seller, the product was defective
when it left the defendant’s control, and the product actually caused
the plaintiff’s injury. Most courts apply the Restatement (Third)’s riskutility analysis when determining whether the defendant should be
liable. 148 If the risk outweighs the usefulness, the product is likely
unreasonably dangerous, and the defendant can be held liable under
the design defect theory of products liability. 149

143. Id.
144. See O’Neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987, 1006–07 (Cal. 2012); Anderson v. OwensCorning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 556 (Cal. 1991) (holding that a defendant in a
strict products liability action based on an alleged failure to warn may present evidence
to show that the particular risk was neither known nor knowable at the time of
manufacture and/or distribution); Brown v. Super. Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 484 (Cal. 1988)
(holding that defendant drug manufacturer was not liable for claims that were
scientifically unknowable at the time of distribution); Garcia v. Becker Bros. Steel Co., 125
Cal. Rptr. 3d 73, 82 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that defendant had no control over the
“slitter line” machinery that injured plaintiff and, therefore, owed him no duty of care).
145. O’Neil, 266 P.3d at 1007; Brown, 751 P.2d at 484.
146. 266 P.3d 987.
147. Id. at 1007. In this case the plaintiff’s decedent was exposed to asbestos while
working on a ship. Though asbestos was found on the internal gaskets and packing
originally supplied with defendant’s products, those items were manufactured by a
third party, and none of the original parts remained present on the ship at the time
the plaintiff’s decedent was there.
148. Supra note 134.
149. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 306 (N.J. 1983).
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B. Strict Liability: Ultrahazardous Activities
Courts impose strict liability when the actor chooses to engage in an
ultrahazardous activity.150 Most courts have adopted the rule from Rylands
to impose strict liability when the injury stems from abnormally dangerous
conditions and activities.151 The Restatement (Third) states that “[o]ne
who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for
harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity,
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.”152
Courts generally, as a matter of policy, do not find that guns are
unreasonably dangerous. 153 In Miller v. Civil Constructors, Inc., 154 the
court addressed the question of whether the defendant, the owner of
a shooting range, was strictly liable when a stray bullet ricocheted
during the course of a firearm practice and caused an injury to the
plaintiff. 155 The plaintiff argued that the defendant was strictly liable
because he had control of the premises, and the use of firearms should
be classified as ultrahazardous activity. 156 The court held that the use
of firearms is not an ultrahazardous activity and declined to impose
liability. 157 Similarly, in McCarthy, the plaintiff argued that the defendant
bullet manufacturer negligently marketed ammunition for sale to the

150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. §§ 1–2 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
151. Rylands v. Fletcher, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. 1865), rev’d, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (Ex. Ch.
1866), aff’d, 3 L.R.-E & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868)(holding that a person should be held
liable for damage that is the natural consequence of his activity).
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 519 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
The Restatement provides six factors the courts look to when determining whether an
activity is ultrahazardous: (1) existence of high degree of risk of some harm to the
person, land or chattels of others; (2) likelihood that the harm that results from it will
be great; (3) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (4) extent
to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; (5) inappropriateness of the
activity to the place where it is carried on; and (6) the extent to which its value to the
community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes. Id.
153. Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 133 (Cal. 2001) (dismissing the claim
against defendant gun manufacturer because state law precluded such claims as a
matter of public policy); Miller v. Civil Constructors, Inc. 651 N.E.2d at 239, 245 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995).
154. 272 651 N.E.2d at 239.
155. Id. at 241; Rylands v. Fletcher, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866).
156. Miller, 651 N.E.2d at 244 (stating that the question is “whether the risk created
is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or because of the circumstances
surrounding it, as to justify the imposition of strict liability even though the activity is
carried on with all reasonable care”).
157. Id. at 242 (noting in dicta that another court suggested that the use of
handguns may be an ultrahazardous activity but concluding that there is no basis for that
argument (citing Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984)).
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general public. 158 Because of the severe wounding power of the bullets,
the plaintiff argued that the sale and marketing should have been
restricted to law enforcement agencies, for whom the bullet was
designed. 159 The court held that courts do not impose a duty on
manufacturers to control the distribution of potentially dangerous
products, such as ammunition, and that, though it may have been
foreseeable that a criminal may misuse the bullets, the manufacturer
has no duty and is not liable for such misuse. 160
Some state courts have held that gun manufacturers and marketers
can be held strictly liable for injuries resulting from the criminal
misuse of a certain type of unreasonably dangerous firearms, called
“Saturday Night Specials.” 161 Saturday Night Specials are low-weight
guns of low quality that have short barrels. Most importantly, they are
easily concealable and are known for their inaccurate and variable
shots. 162 In 1990, the state of Maryland banned their sale, citing
concerns over high rates of gun-related homicides. 163 In Kelley v. R.G.
Industries, Inc., 164 the Maryland Court of Appeals held that “it is entirely
consistent with public policy to hold the manufacturers and marketers
of ‘Saturday Night Special’ handguns strictly liable to innocent persons
who suffer gunshot injuries from the criminal use of their products.” 165
Further, the court reasoned that Saturday Night Specials are unfit for
158. McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 151, 156 (2d Cir. 1997).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 156–57 (stating that “in tort cases, foreseeability is often confused with
duty”). The court also noted in dicta that “[i]t is unreasonable to impose [a] duty
where the realities of every day experience show us that, regardless of the measures taken,
there is little expectation that the one made responsible could prevent the . . . conduct [of
another].” Id. (citing Pulka v. Edelman, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (N.Y. 1976)).
161. City of N.Y. v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 369, 379 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (discussing “Saturday Night Special” guns and stating that certain brands of
cheap handguns are more likely to give rise to public danger when they are in the
hands of criminals); Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1149–50 (Md.
2002) (discussing Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1153–54 (Md. 1985)). But
see Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 773–74 (D.N.M. 1987) (dismissing the
claim against gun manufacturer and declining to follow Kelley).
162. Daniel W. Webster, Jon S. Vernick & Lisa M. Hepburn, Effects of Maryland’s Law
Banning “Saturday Night Special” Handguns on Homicides, 155 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 406
(2002). But see “Saturday Night Specials”, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION
(Apr. 21, 1999), https://www.nraila.org/articles/19990421/saturday-night-specials
[https://perma.cc/DHC9-32EX].
163. Webster, supra note 162, at 406; Maryland Bans Sale of Saturday Night Specials, L.A.
TIMES (May 23, 1988), http://articles.latimes.com/1988-05-23/news/mn-2270_1_nightspecials [https://perma.cc/N7SW-ECJL].
164. 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985).
165. Id. at 1159.

2322

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:101

any legitimate use because they are “too inaccurate, unreliable and
poorly made for use by law enforcement personnel, sportsmen,
homeowners or businessmen.” 166 The court went on to state that the
primary value of these types of weapons is in criminal activity due to their
easy concealability and low price, but the use of a handgun in a
commission of a crime is not a “legitimate” use justified by public
policy. 167 The court’s reasoning in Kelley suggests that not every gun
should be classified the same and that some can be abnormally
dangerous depending on their characteristics.
From Rylands on, courts have applied this doctrine to a very limited
number of activities and have largely declined to expand the scope of
activities that are considered abnormally dangerous. 168 In general,
courts have declined to classify weapons and bullets as abnormally
dangerous, finding instead that despite their inherent danger, the use
of guns and bullets is a matter of common usage, and the social utility
justifies their use. 169
III. ANALYSIS
As a commercial seller of CAD files, Defense Distributed is subject to the
traditional laws applicable to sellers and manufacturers of products and can
be held strictly liable for injuries caused by 3D-printed weapons.
Specifically, Defense Distributed can be held liable because its product fails
to incorporate a necessary safety feature, and such failure makes the 3Dprinted guns unreasonably dangerous under the design defect theory of
products liability. Additionally, due to the highly hazardous nature of
the 3D-printed weapons, and the potential threat to public safety and
national security, the public release of the CAD files is an abnormally
dangerous activity. Commercial sellers, like Defense Distributed, have
a duty to prevent the injury entirely and should be held strictly liable
for any harm resulting from such activity.

166. Id. at 1158.
167. Id.
168. Among others, courts have held that the following activities are abnormally
dangerous: blasting (especially if done in a residential area), transportation and
storage of toxic chemicals and inflammable liquids, pile driving, crop dusting,
fumigation with toxic gases, testing of rockets, fireworks display, and others. See
Prosser, supra note 87, at 755–56.
169. McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 151, 156 (2d Cir. 1997).
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A. Commercial Sellers of CAD Files Can be Held Strictly Liable for Injuries
Caused by 3D-Printed Guns
In a products liability action against Defense Distributed, a plaintiff
would be able to prevail because Defense Distributed’s CAD files
contain a design defect that makes them unreasonably dangerous.
The files allow a user to print an untraceable, un-registerable, plastic
weapon that can be used to seriously injure or kill a person and are
thus unreasonably dangerous.
Under the traditional laws of products liability, a “product” must
cause the injury to a foreseeable user, and the defendant must be a
“seller engaged in the business” before he can be held liable. 170
However, the uniqueness of 3D printing poses many legal challenges
for those injured by 3D-printed guns. 171
One challenge in determining liability for injuries caused by 3Dprinted weapons is the difficulty in deciding which specific actor to
hold liable. 172 Many actors play a role in the 3D-printing process and
may potentially be held liable for an injury caused by a defective
product. 173 There are six potential categories of defendants: (1) the
“occasional or hobbyist inventors” who design such files and share
them on the internet for free; (2) the commercial sellers who sell CAD
files online; (3) third party services that are in the business of printing
out the designs for profit; (4) the manufacturers of 3D printers; (5)
the computer programmer that writes the code that instructs the 3D
printer to print; and (6) the provider of materials used to print the
products. 174 Because this Comment only focuses on liability of
commercial sellers like Defense Distributed, it will only be addressing
the second category of commercial sellers who sell CAD files online.
Another challenge in determining liability for 3D-printed weapons
is showing that a CAD file is a “product.” The doctrine of strict liability
applies only if a defective “product” is introduced into the stream of

170. Supra Section II.A.
171. Supra Section II.A.
172. Supra Section II.A.
173. See Lindenfeld, supra note 86, at 90–94 (discussing how strict liability will be
imposed in the context of 3D printing of medical products).
174. Wang, supra note 85, at 106–07, 112 (discussing six possible defendants against
whom the plaintiff may bring action); see also Giulio Coraggio, Top 3 Legal Issues of 3D
Printing!, DLA PIPER, https://www.technologyslegaledge.com/2015/09/top-3-legal-issuesof-3d-printing [https://perma.cc/R758-V6GH]; Life Sciences, supra note 87, at 17.
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commerce. 175 Otherwise, commercial sellers cannot be held strictly
liable for injuries caused by their products. 176
1. Defense Distributed is a commercial seller
Defense Distributed is a commercial seller engaged in the business
of selling CAD files for 3D-printed guns. 177 To qualify as a “seller,” the
company does not need to be engaged exclusively or even primarily in
selling or otherwise distributing the blueprints for 3D-printed
weapons, but the sale cannot be occasional or casual. 178 Aside from
selling the blueprints online, Defense Distributed sells a milling
machine used for carving gun components out of aluminum and a
variety of supporting hardware and software products. 179 The company
began selling the machine online in 2014 through its for-profit
subsidiary, the “Ghost Gunner,” for $2000 per unit and has sold
roughly around 6000 units so far. 180 According to its website, Ghost
Gunner is a “manufacturing concern managed by Defense
Distributed.” 181 The sale of the milling machine and the supporting
hardware and software products, combined with the sale of blueprints
for 3D-printed weapons, show Defense Distributed is not “an
occasional seller.”
175. Supra Section II.A (noting that a “product” introduced into the stream of
commerce is necessary for a finding of strict liability).
176. David W. Lannetti, Toward a Revised Definition of “Product” Under the Restatement
(Third) Of Torts: Products Liability, 55 BUS. LAW. 799, 806–07 (2000); see supra Part II.
177. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. Defense Distribute gives users the
option to “Buy” blueprints on their website. Id.
178. See Garcia v. Becker Bros. Steel Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 73, 79, 82 (Cal. Ct. App.
2011) (holding that under California law, an occasional seller is not strictly liable for
sale of a defective product and noting that defendants were occasional sellers because
they were not a “conduit for the production or distribution” of the product);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 20 (AM. LAW INST. 998). See generally
Lindenfeld, supra note 86, at 90–91 (quoting the Restatement to illustrate the point
that strict liability does not apply to “the housewife who, on one occasion, sells to her
neighbor a jar of jam or a pound of sugar,” but it does apply as long as the sale of the
product is “other than occasional or casual”).
179. Defense Distributed sells the “Ghost Gunner” on its sister website,
ghostgunner.net, GHOST GUNNER, https://ghostgunner.net/faq [https://perma.cc/
ME5A-VZPJ]. See generally Thierer & Marcus, supra note 7, at 836 (discussing Defense
Distributed’s operations).
180. See Andy Greenberg, The 3-D Printed Gun Machine Rolls on, with or Without Cody Wilson,
WIRED (Sept. 25, 2018, 05:31 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/cody-wilson-3d-printedguns-resigns-defense-distributed [https://perma.cc/GG4B-4ERL]; Products, GHOST GUNNER,
https://ghostgunner.net/featured-products [https://perma.cc/2B QX-BP25].
181. What is Ghost Gunner?, GHOST GUNNER, https://ghostgunner.net/faq [https://
perma.cc/ME5A-VZPJ].
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Defense Distributed’s sale of blueprints for 3D-printed guns is
similar to the defendant’s practice of selling computer software used
as a guide for surgical instruments in Corley v. Stryker Corp. 182 The
defendant in Corley, Stryker Corporation, designed and manufactured
the “single-use cutting guide” software using 3D imaging data derived
from MRI and CT scans, which caused injury to the plaintiff during her
surgery. 183 The fact that Stryker Corporation manufactured a wide
range of medical equipment, and the manufacture and sale of this
particular type of software was just one part of its business, does not
lessen its overall liability as a commercial seller for defects arising out
of its products. 184 Similarly, Defense Distributed’s status as a
commercial seller is not dependent on the amount of revenue each of
its products generates.
Unlike the defendant hospital in San Diego, Defense Distributed does
not provide a service. 185 Courts generally decline to hold defendants
strictly liable if the primary goal of their business is to provide a service,
and instead only hold them liable on the basis of negligence or
intentional misconduct. 186 Unlike commercial sellers of CAD files, a
hospital is primarily in the business of providing medical services, and any
sale of equipment or medication is incidental to the overriding purpose of
Conversely, Defense Distributed’s
providing medical services. 187
overriding purpose is selling blueprints, milling machines, and
supporting equipment, and nothing on its website suggests that it
provides any services. 188 Therefore, Defense Distributed is a commercial
seller engaged in business for purposes of strict liability and can be held
liable for injuries committed with its products.

182. No. 6:13-CV-02571, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92002, at *1 (W.D. La. May 27,
2014).
183. Id. at *2.
184. Medical and Surgical Equipment, STRYKER CORP., https://www.stryker.com/us/
en/about.html [https://perma.cc/265H-B4N2].
185. 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 489, 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
186. Id. (holding that the primary objective of the hospital is to provide services for
patients, and any sale of medical products is secondary to its primary objective);
Gonser v. Decker, 814 P.2d 1056, 1058–59 (Okla. Civ. App. 1991) (declining to hold
defendant strictly liable because he is neither a commercial seller nor distributor and
only allows use of equipment as part of providing a service).
187. San Diego, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493; see also Lindenfeld, supra note 86, at 91–92
(discussing 3D printing liability in the context of medical products and concluding
that hospitals will generally not be liable under strict liability because “the primary
objective of hospitals is to provide services, and therefore, any sale of medical products
is simply ancillary to that primary objective”).
188. Supra note 50.
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2. A CAD file is a “product” for purposes of tort liability
CAD files that allow for printing of weapons are necessary parts to
an end product such that they can be subject to tort liability. In Corley
v. Stryker Orthopaedics, 189 the court allowed a products liability claim to
go forward where a plaintiff alleged that the tool used to perform her
surgery contained a software defect that made it unreasonably
dangerous. 190 Accordingly, the court found that the software in
question was a “necessary part of the cutting guide,” but that its design
was unreasonably dangerous. 191 Like the software that was used in Ms.
Corley’s surgery, a CAD file used to print a 3D weapon is a necessary
part of the end product——the 3D-printed gun. Any defects in its
design, such as failure to incorporate a safety device, directly impact
the safety and functionality of the end product.
CAD files are highly technical tools similar to aeronautical charts.
The court in Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons 192 suggested that computer
software could be analogous to aeronautical charts, in that both are
graphic depictions of technical data and “highly technical tools.” 193
The court declined to find defendant book publisher liable for ideas
and thoughts expressed in his book, concluding that the content of
the book is intangible and intangible products are not subject to
But, unlike the Encyclopedia of
products liability lawsuits. 194
Mushrooms that was the subject of litigation in Winter, a CAD file is
more like the aeronautical charts in Brocklesby and Aetna because it
depicts technical data and serves as a “guide” in creating the end
productthe 3D-printed gun. 195 The charts gather all pertinent
aspects of the approach such as distances, minimum altitudes, turns,

189. No. 13-2571, 2014 WL 3125990, at *1 (W.D. La. July 3, 2014).
190. Id. at *2–3 (concluding that the plaintiff stated a plausible claim that (1) the
ShapeMatch Cutting Guide was “unreasonably dangerous in design and (2)
unreasonably dangerous due to inadequate warnings to the extent that no warnings
were provided along with the product”).
191. Id.
192. 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
193. Id. at 1036 (stating that “[a]eronautical charts are highly technical tools. They
are graphic depictions of technical, mechanical data. The best analogy to an
aeronautical chart is a compass. . . . Computer software that fails to yield the result for
which it was designed may be another [example]”).
194. Id.
195. See Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1294–95 (9th Cir. 1985); Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co. 642 F.2d 339, 341–42 (9th Cir. 1981); see also supra
note 21 (describing the process of 3D printing; during the FDM process, the CAD file
serves as a “guide” for the printer as it contains the data that the printer needs to
produce the final object).
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procedures to be followed, and others. 196 The CAD file similarly acts
as a guide for the 3D printer, which cannot produce the final object
without the data from the CAD file. 197
Further, like electricity, CAD files can be made, produced,
transmitted, and distributed in the stream of commerce. 198 The “sale”
of electricity takes place at the meter where the charges are generally
computed, and strict liability does not apply prior to the “sale.” 199 For
the defendant to be liable, the electricity must have been in a defective
condition when it left the possession of the electric company. 200 In
Ransome v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 201 the court held the defendant
electric company liable because the electricity became a defective
product when it left the hands of the defendant in a state that was
unreasonably dangerous to the consumer. 202 Similarly, a CAD file
becomes a product for which a commercial seller must assume liability
when it enters the stream of commerce. If it contains a defect that
makes it unreasonably dangerous, such as if the file allows the
purchaser to print a weapon but it fails to incorporate a safety device
or provide adequate warnings, then the commercial seller becomes
responsible for injuries caused by their product’s defects. 203
Most courts have so far declined to impose strict liability in cases
involving computer software. 204 Such claims most frequently arise
against video game manufacturers. 205 In those cases, courts generally
196. Brocklesby, 767 F.2d at 1295.
197. Supra note 21.
198. See Bryant v. Tri-County Elec. Membership Corp., 844 F. Supp. 347, 352 (W.D.
Ky. 1994) (concluding that ordinary electricity is a product); Hous. Lighting & Power
Co. v. Reynolds, 765 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. 1988) (holding that electricity is a product
because it can be manufactured, transported, and sold in the stream of commerce);
Ransome v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 275 N.W.2d 641, 648–49 (Wis. 1979) (stating that the
company supplying the electricity can be held liable if the electricity was unreasonably
dangerous when it left the seller’s hands).
199. Ransome, 275 N.W.2d at 648–49.
200. Id. at 648.
201. 275 N.W.2d 641 (Wis. 1979).
202. Id. at 649.
203. See, e.g., supra note 69 and accompanying text.
204. See Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc. 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 173–74 (D. Conn. 2013)
(holding that an interactive video game is not “product”); Sanders v. Acclaim Entm’t,
Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1281–82 (D. Colo. 2002) (holding that computer games
are software and not products); James v. Meow Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 798, 811
(W.D. Ky. 2000) (rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that video games are software for
purposes of strict liability).
205. See, e.g., Wilson, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 173 (noting the existence of a distinct class
of cases involving video game players alleging harm resulting from the intellectual
aspect of the electronic medium).
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conclude that the computer software is an intangible expression of
ideas, thoughts, and images protected under the First Amendment,
and not a product for purposes of strict liability. 206 Further, courts
often find that such claims fail for lack of proximate cause, 207 as the
link between the injury and defendant’s conduct is too attenuated. 208
For example, in Sanders v. Acclaim Entertainment Inc., 209 two students
who killed their classmates and a teacher in a school shooting were
heavy consumers of violent video games and movies. 210 They sued the
video game manufacturers alleging that the video game “had the effect
of ‘harmfully influencing impressionable minors . . . and thereby
caused the shooting.’” 211 The court held that video game software is
not a product, and that plaintiffs’ intentional violent acts were a
superseding cause that relieved defendants of liability. 212 Further, in
James v. Meow Media, Inc., 213 the court similarly held that “thoughts,
ideas, and images” expressed through defendant’s movies and video
games were not products, and a school shooting was not a response the
defendant could have reasonably foreseen. 214
A commercial seller of CAD files would likely argue that a CAD file
is computer software and not a product, and further, that even if the
file was a product, the designer should not be held liable for injuries
caused by the end product because the customer, not the seller,
actually printed the gun. However, CAD files that can be used to print
functional, plastic weapons differ from software used in the making of
movies and video games. First, the CAD files do not express “thoughts,
ideas, and images” protected by the First Amendment and are instead
analogous to technical data, such as aeronautical charts. 215 Second, it
is much more foreseeable that someone may use an unregistered,
plastic weapon for criminal activity than it is that a video game will
compel a consumer to carry out a mass shooting. 216

206. Id. at 181–82.
207. See Sanders, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1276 (quoting City of Aurora v. Loveless, 639
P.2d 1061, 1063 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (defining proximate cause as conduct that
produces the claimed injury “in the natural and probable sequence of things”)).
208. Id.
209. 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Colo. 2002).
210. Id. at 1268.
211. Id. at 1269.
212. Id. at 1281–82.
213. 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002).
214. Id. at 688–89, 693, 701.
215. Supra note 193 and accompanying text.
216. Supra Section IV.B.
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B. 3D-Printed Gun Contains a Product Defect that Makes it Unreasonably
Dangerous
A CAD file that can produce an untraceable, un-registerable, plastic
weapon contains a design defect because it poses an unreasonably high
risk of injury to foreseeable users. By uploading the CAD file on the
internet, Defense Distributed places its product in the stream of commerce
and becomes strictly liable for any injuries that any manufacturer or seller
would be liable for under the current doctrine of products liability.217
Failure to incorporate a “safety feature” in its design that would
reduce the risk of injury makes Defense Distributed’s design
unreasonably dangerous. Under the design defect theory of products
liability, a product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the
adoption of a reasonable alternative design, and the omission of the
alternative design renders the product unsafe. 218 For example, in cases
involving gun manufactures, courts have held that an omission of an
external safety device may constitute a design defect that makes the
product unreasonably dangerous. 219 In Smith and LeMaster, both courts
concluded that installing a safety was feasible, inexpensive, and would
have likely prevented the plaintiffs’ injuries and failure to do so may
have constituted a product defect. 220 Similarly, “the Liberator” does
not have a safety device that would prevent a user from accidentally
firing the gun and injuring someone. 221
Defense Distributed could also be held strictly liable for injuries
arising out of its product under the Third Restatement’s risk-utility
balancing test. 222 The factors weigh strongly in favor of finding that an
untraceable, yet functional, 3D-printed weapon poses a much greater

217. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963) (noting
that a “manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to a human being”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. §§ 1–
2 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
218. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. §§ 1–2 (AM. LAW INST. 1998); see
supra Section III.A.
219. Smith v. Bryco Arms, 33 P.3d 638, 650 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001); LeMaster v. Glock,
Inc., 610 So. 2d 1336, 1339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
220. Smith, 33 P.3d at 649–50; LeMaster, 610 So. 2d at 1338.
221. See Jacob Silverman, A Gun, a Printer, an Ideology, NEW YORKER, May 7, 2013,
https://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/a-gun-a-printer-an-ideology
[https://perma.cc/RTR7-8ZXA].
222. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (listing the factors courts use when
engaging in risk-utility analysis).
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risk of harm when compared to the social utility of the product. 223 The
safety concerns are obvious: a fully functional, plastic weapon, not
subject to any procedural safeguards normally applicable to gun
ownership, is likely to be misused for criminal activity and will severely
undermine government efforts to combat terrorism and crime. 224 In
fact, in Washington v. United States Department of State, 225 the court stated
that safety concerns regarding the ready availability of plastic guns far
outweigh the utility of allowing their use and that government’s
interests in protecting national security outweigh its interest in
protecting First Amendment rights. 226 On the other hand, the
assessment of the utility of the product also takes into consideration
the availability of a safer substitute product, or as the courts refer to it,
the “state-of-the-art.” 227 Such an inquiry relates to both components of
the risk-utility equation, meaning that while the focus is on the
usefulness of the product, the inquiry must also determine the
reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct in placing the product
on the market. 228 The answer will depend on the facts of each case. 229
In this case, Defense Distributed would likely argue that a substitute
product is not available because any change in the design that would
make it safe would eliminate its inherent characteristic—that of being
a functional gun. However, even if it would be hard for a plaintiff to show
the availability of a substitute design, the risk-utility analysis is a balancing
test, and the risk greatly outweighs the utility of 3D-printed weapons.230

223. Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 318 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1261 (W.D. Wash.
2018). The court noted that
[a] gun made from plastic is virtually undetectable in metal detectors and
other security equipment intended to promote public safety and airports,
sporting events, courthouses, music venues . . . . The portability and ease of a
manufacturing process that can be set up virtually anywhere would allow those
who are, by law, prohibited from manufacturing, possessing, and/or using
guns to more easily evade those limitations.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text (listing the factors the courts use when
engaging in risk-utility analysis).
224. See Washington, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 1261.
225. Id. at 1247.
226. Id. at 1261 (suggesting that undetectable guns with no identifying information
will hamper government’s efforts to prevent and/or investigate crime).
227. O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 304–05 (N.J. 1983).
228. Id. at 305.
229. Id.
230. See Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 318 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1254 (W.D. Wash.
2018) (stating that “the balance of hardships and the public interest tip[] sharply in
the [government’s] favor”).
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Further, 3D-printed guns are not products that fill a critical need. 231
In O’Brien, the court noted that the analysis of the utility of a product
also involves the consideration of whether the product is considered
essential, one that fills a critical need, or a luxury item. 232 But the Court
goes on to note that there are still those products, “including some for
which no alternative exists, [that] are so dangerous and of such little
use that under the risk-utility analysis, a manufacturer would bear the
cost of liability of harm to others.” 233 3D-printed guns fall in this
category because the likelihood that a 3D-printed gun would cause
injury to a foreseeable user is high. 234 At least one incident was already
reported of a young man threatening to carry out a mass shooting at
his school with a 3D-printed weapon because it “could not be traced
back to him.” 235 With the rate of mass murders in the United States, it
is foreseeable that those who are not legally allowed to purchase a
weapon, such as mentally ill persons, terrorists, or convicted felons, would
use a plastic untraceable gun to cause injury to others in hopes of avoiding
the legal requirements involved in purchasing a traditional weapon. 236
Additionally, the design of the product, specifically the fact that it
looks like a children’s toy, makes it even less safe and the probability
of injury even higher. 237 With numerous anecdotal examples of
children harming themselves after picking up a conventional firearm,
it is highly foreseeable that a young child would pick up a plastic 3D–
printed gun because he mistook it for a toy. 238

231. See O’Brien, 463 A.2d at 306.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See Washington, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 1261.
235. Reavy, supra note 10.
236. See Fox, supra note 3 (noting that “[t]here are more public mass shootings in
America than in any other country in the world”).
237. See Washington, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 1261 (stating in dicta that “the toy-like appearance
[of the gun] increases the risk of unintentional discharge, injury, and/or death”).
238. See, e.g., Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1147–48 (Md. 2002)
(providing details on how a three-year-old child died after taking a firearm from under
a mattress and loading it with a magazine); Smith v. Bryco Arms, 33 P.3d 638, 641–42
(N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (detailing the accidental shooting of a fourteen-year-old boy by
his fifteen-year-old friend).

2332

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:101

C. Publishing CAD Files Online is an Ultrahazardous Activity
Publicly releasing files on the internet that allow anyone to print a
plastic, undetectable weapon is an abnormally dangerous activity. 239 In
Rylands, the court held that a defendant who chooses to engage in an
ultrahazardous 240 activity should bear the costs and be liable for any
damage that is the “natural consequence” of his activity. 241 Generally,
courts have declined to hold that use of firearms is ultrahazardous and
is a matter of common usage. 242 For example, in Miller, the court held
that even though guns are dangerous, and even highly dangerous,
when analyzed under the criteria stated in the Restatement, their use
cannot be classified as ultrahazardous. 243 First, the court concluded
that the risk of harm to persons and property can be eliminated by
exercise of reasonable care, whereas the doctrine of strict liability is
applicable to those activates for which “no degree of care can truly
provide safety.” 244 Second, the court also concluded that the use of
firearms is a matter of common usage and the harm comes from
improper usage, not from their inherent dangers. 245 However, in
Miller, the court was faced with an issue involving a traditional weapon,
but the particular nature of a 3D-printed gun makes it different from
a regular gun. 246 The doctrine of strict liability should be applicable
because no degree of care can truly provide safety in the case of 3D239. An activity is abnormally dangerous when it “creates a foreseeable and highly
significant risk of physical harm even when reasonable care is exercised by all actors;
and the activity is not one of common usage.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB.
FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 (AM. LAW. INST. 2010).
240. Some judicial opinions use the terms “ultrahazardous” and “abnormally
dangerous” interchangeably. The first Restatement used the term “ultrahazardous”
and applied it to an activity that “necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the persons,
land or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care
and . . . is not a matter of common usage.” The Second and Third Restatements use the
term “abnormally dangerous” and make the decision of whether something is
abnormally dangerous depend on the location and that nature of the activity that takes place.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. §§ 1–2 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
241. Rylands v. Fletcher, 1 L.R.-Exch. 265 (1866) (holding that a landowner was
strictly liable for all the natural and probable consequences of his activities); see also
Miller v. Civil Constructors, Inc. 651 N.E.2d 239, 241–42 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (stating
in dicta that best known applications of Rylands rule involve imposing strict liability in
relation to storage and use of explosives and flammable materials).
242. See Miller, 651 N.E.2d at 242.
243. Id. at 243.
244. Id. at 245.
245. Id.
246. Id.; see Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 318 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1261 (W.D.
Wash. 2018) (noting the plastic, toy-like appearance of a 3-D-printed weapon is distinct
and more dangerous than a conventional firearm).
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printed weapons. In other words, as currently designed, 3D-printed
guns are dangerous because they are untraceable, plastic, easily
mistakable for a children’s toy, and anyone could get access to them.247
Additionally, the use of 3D-printed weapons, unlike traditional guns, is not
a matter of common usage, nor is it subject to any of the traditional
safeguards applicable to regular weapons.248 However, despite the inherent
dangers associated with these plastic weapons, based on precedent it is
unlikely that the release of the CAD files would be classified as
ultrahazardous as the courts have traditionally been very hesitant to
expand the pool of activities considered ultrahazardous. 249
Further, 3D-printed weapons are similar to “Saturday Night Special”
guns, in that they are also poor quality, easy to conceal, easily
accessible, and unfit for any legitimate use by law enforcement,
sportsmen, or homeowners because they are inaccurate and poorly
made. 250 In Kelley, the court concluded that these types of weapons are
more likely to give rise to public danger when they are in the hands of
criminals. 251 Similarly, 3D-printed weapons may likely become
prominent among handguns involved in crime because they are easily
accessible and undetectable by standard metal detectors. 252 In
Washington, the court expressed great concern that the undetectable
and untraceable nature of the 3D-printed guns poses a unique danger,
concluding that their further publication “is not harmless.” 253
However, Maryland was the only state to actually ban the sale of
“Saturday Night Specials,” and a subsequent study showed that their
ban did not decrease firearm homicide rates which was the primary
reason behind the law. 254 Additionally, a commercial seller of CAD
files could argue that, aside from the lack of a safety feature, a 3D-

247. See Washington, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 1263 (noting that “[t]he very purpose for
which the private defendants seek to release this technical data is to arm every citizen
outside of the government’s traditional control mechanisms of licenses, serial
numbers, and registration. It is the untraceable and undetectable nature of these
small firearms that poses a unique danger”).
248. Supra Section II.B.
249. Supra Section II.B.
250. Supra Section II.B (discussing a category of weapons known as “Saturday Night
Specials”).
251. Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1153–54 (Md. 1985); see also City of
N.Y. v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 369, 379 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing
“Saturday Night Special” guns and stating that certain brands of cheap handguns are
more likely to give rise to public danger when they are in the hands of criminals).
252. See Webster, supra note 162, at 406.
253. 318 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1263 (W.D. Wash. 2018).
254. See Webster, supra note 162, at 406.
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printed weapon is not different than other weapons which can also be
easily concealable, fairly cheap, and easily accessible. It is foreseeable
that a criminal would use a fully functional, untraceable, 3D-printed
weapon to commit a crime. Courts generally hold that an intervening
criminal act by a third party cuts off liability, unless the intentional act
is foreseeable. 255 Though the court in McCarthy dismissed the claims
against a bullet manufacturer, concluding that some products, such as
knives and bullets, must be, by their very nature, dangerous to be
functional, the nature of the 3D-printed gun makes it different than
other weapons. In McCarthy, the dissent noted that “an intervening act
may not serve as a superseding cause, and relieve an actor of
responsibility, where the risk of the intervening act occurring is the very
same risk which renders the actor negligent.” 256 Further, the majority
agreed that the criminal act such as a mass shooting is foreseeable and
stated that the jury should be the one to decide the issue of proximate
cause. 257 Similarly, the risk that Defense Distributed is creating by selling
blueprints for weapons that anyone can download is the risk that these
products are going to be ultimately used to commit crimes. 258
The very design of this particular gun makes it even more
foreseeable that someone would misuse it. 3D-printed guns are
undetectable by standard metal detectors, they do not require a
background check or registration, and they are easily accessible,
including to those groups of individuals who are barred by law from
obtaining a gun, such as children, convicted felons, and the mentally
ill. 259 For these reasons, it is highly foreseeable that criminals would
use the 3D-printed gun for criminal activity, and the defective design
is what makes Defense Distributed ultimately liable.
Defense Distributed’s CAD files contain a design defect that makes
them unreasonably dangerous to the purchaser because they allow for
unregulated self-production of plastic, toy-like, untraceable weapons.
255. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 154–55 (2d Cir. 1997); Young
v. Bryco Arms, 765 N.E.2d 1, 18–19 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001), rev’d, 213 Ill. 2d (Ill. 2004).
The Restatement is somewhat vague on what constitutes a foreseeable intervening act,
and simply states that intervening acts that are “unforeseeable, unusual, or highly
culpable” may be outside the scope of the risk. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB.
FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 34, cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
256. McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 165 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
257. See id. at 151, 157. The court ultimately declined to grant certification and
affirmed the district court’s judgment. Id.
258. Though not a products liability case, in Washington v. United States Department of State,
the court expressed concerns that these weapons will be used for criminal activity and even
terrorism due to their characteristics. 318 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1259, 1263 (W.D. Wash. 2018).
259. See id.
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These weapons pose an unreasonably high risk of injury to foreseeable
users such as young children who might easily mistake a 3D-printed
gun for a toy. Strict liability laws dictate that a “commercial seller” that
introduces a defective “product” into the stream of commerce can be
held strictly liable for injuries arising from defects of his products.
Because Defense Distributed meets these criteria, it can be held strictly
liable for injuries caused by 3D-printed guns.
CONCLUSION
The invention of 3D-printing has the potential to change our lives—
from how we eat and shop, to how we do business and how fast we can
cure diseases. Aside from the positive changes, 3D printing poses
serious safety concerns because it allows for printing of plastic,
untraceable, deadly weapons. This Comment argues that commercial
sellers such as Defense Distributed can be held strictly liable for injuries
caused by 3D-printed guns under the products liability doctrine because
the design of CAD files makes the 3D-printed guns unreasonably
dangerous. Furthermore, public policy underlying strict liability justifies
holding commercial sellers liable for injuries caused by their
For example, as a commercial seller that sells,
products. 260
manufactures, and markets the blueprints for 3D-printed guns, Defense
Distributed took on a special responsibility that requires it to bear the
costs of accidents that are proximately caused by defects in its products.
As previously discussed, the printing of 3D firearms is not currently
subject to federal regulation, and the few state efforts to pass 3D gun
printing laws have so far been largely unsuccessful. While commercial
sellers of CAD files should be held strictly liable for injuries caused by
3D-printed guns for reasons discussed in this Comment, doing so
would only serve to address liability after the injury has already
happened. Further, courts have not yet addressed whether a CAD file
is a “product” for the purpose of imposing strict liability and imposing
liability under the current law will likely prove challenging because 3D
printing technology changes the traditional roles of sellers,
manufacturers, and consumers. A commercial seller of CAD files
would likely argue that a CAD file is not a product, and even if it were,
the designer should not be held liable for injuries arising out of the
end product because someone else actually printed the gun.
260. See Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1295 (9th Cir. 1985); Escola v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 444 (Cal. 1944); see also Lindenfeld, supra note
86, at 95 (concluding that holding CAD designers strictly liable for defects in 3D-printed
medical devices is most consistent with the policy objectives of strict liability law).
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Additionally, if a designer of a CAD file were to change the design to
include a safety device, it would seemingly make these weapons safer
and potentially allow the designer to avoid being subject to strict
liability. For these reasons, and due to the immediate and dangerous
potential for serious harm, policymakers should impose restrictions on
the manufacture of 3D-printed weapons. 261 Many states have taken
steps to ban 3D-gun printing, and in 2013, Philadelphia became the
first city in the United States to do so. 262 Congressmen from Rhode
Island, New Jersey, California, Massachusetts, and others have plans to
introduce bills that would ban 3D-printed guns. 263 Enacting laws that
directly ban 3D-gun printing across the nation may be the most direct
way to immediately prevent injuries from misuse of such products. 264

261. See Thierer & Marcus, supra note 7, at 839.
262. Alexis Kleinman, Philadelphia Is the First U.S. City to Ban 3D Printed Guns,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 26, 2013, 2:49 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/
11/26/3d-gun-philadelphia_n_4344733 [https://perma.cc/8LQ6-8A5F]; see also Jonathan
Danielczyk, 3-D Printed Guns: A Developing Technology with Dangerous Potential, 17 PITT. J. TECH.
L. & POL’Y 17, 27–29 (2017) (analyzing the validity of laws that ban 3D-printed weapons).
263. See Greenberg, supra note 39 (stating that New York congressmen have called
for renewed legislation to ban any firearm that cannot be detected in a metal detector;
Britain updates rules banning 3-D printer guns, REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2013, 10:25 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-guns/britain-updates-rules-banning-3dprinter-guns-idUSBRE9B40OV20131205 [https://perma.cc/36K8-4ZRA] (discussing
British law that makes 3D printing of guns illegal and punishable by up to 10 years in
prison); see also Firearms Control Legislation and Policy:. Singapore, LIB. OF CONG.,
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/firearms-control/singapore.php [https://perma.cc/
C7C6-NZEP] (Singapore has the toughest gun control laws in the world, and printing
an unlicensed gun is punishable by death).
264. Such legislation would likely face backlash for its potential to infringe on First
and Second Amendment rights. Although, in Washington v. United States Department of
State, the court concluded that the government’s interest in protecting national
security outweighed interest in protecting First Amendment rights. See 318 F. Supp.
3d 1247, 1263–64 (W.D. Wash. 2018).

